Formal learning theory constitutes an attempt to describe and explain the phenomenon of language acquisition. The considerations in this domain are also applicable in philosophy of science, where it can be interpreted as a theory of empirical inquiry. The main issue within this theory is to determine which classes of languages are learnable and how learnability is affected by e.g. restricting the learning functions, modifying the informativeness of the incoming data and changing the conditions of success of the learning process. All those directions focus on various properties of the process of conjecturechange over time. Treating "conjectures" as beliefs, we link the process of conjecture-change to doxastic update. Using this approach, we reconstruct and analyze the temporal aspect of learning in the context of temporal and dynamic logics of belief change.
In the next steps we define what it means for a learning function to successfully learn a class of sets. We will define three inequivalent conditions for learning: identification in the limit, finite identification and learning by erasing. Having them, we can define the "learning problem" to be:
• Is there a learning function L that successfully learns (wrt the appropriate learning condition) on a given learning background?
To get a more fine-grained picture, before we define the conditions for a learning function to be successful, we will focus on the data that learning functions learn from: environments.
Let us consider E, the set of all computably enumerable sets. Let C ⊆ E be some class of c.e. sets. For each S in C we consider Turing machines h n which generate S and in such a case we say that n is an index of S. The Turing machines will function as the conjectures that Learner makes. It is well-known that each S has infinitely many indices. Let us take I S to be the set of all indices of the set S, i.e, I S = {n|h n generates S}.
Definition 1.3 (Environment).
An environment of S is a surjective ω-sequence from S ω Definition 1.4 (Notation). Let ε be an environment. We will use the following notation:
• ε n is the n-th element of ε;
• ε|n is the sequence (ε 1 , ε 2 , . . . , ε n−1 );
• content(ε) is a set of elements that occur in ε;
• h n will refer to a hypothesis, i.e., a finite description of a set, a Turing machine generating S;
• L is a learning function -a map from finite data sequences to indexes of hypotheses, L : Σ * → N.
Now we can provide definitions of different kinds of learnability. In each case, the structure of identifiability in the limit can be formulated by a chain of definitions that describe three levels of identification. Definition 1.5 (Identification in the limit, LIM [9] ). We say that a learning function L:
1. identifies S ∈ C in the limit on ε iff there is a number k, such that for co-finitely many m, L(ε|m) = k and k ∈ I S ; 2. identifies S ∈ C in the limit iff it identifies S in the limit on every ε for S;
3. identifies C in the limit iff it identifies in the limit every S ∈ C.
The notion of identifiability can be strengthened in various ways. One radical case is to introduce a finite condition for identification. Definition 1.6 (Finite identification, FIN). We say that a learning function L:
1. finitely identifies S ∈ C on ε iff, when successively fed ε, at some point L outputs a single k, such that k ∈ I S , and stops;
2. finitely identifies S ∈ C iff it finitely identifies S on every ε for S;
3. finitely identifies C iff it finitely identifies every S ∈ C.
Another, epistemically plausible, way to learn is learning by elimination of hypotheses that are implausible, e.g. hypotheses that are inconsistent with the incoming data. This paradigm is formalized in the framework of learning by erasing.
Definition 1.7 (Function stabilization).
In learning by erasing we say that a function stabilizes to number k on environment ε iff for co-finitely many n ∈ N * : k = min{N − {L(ε|1), . . . , L(ε|n)}}.
Definition 1.8 (Learning by erasing, e-learning [10] ). We say that a learning function L:
1. learns S ∈ C by erasing on ε iff L stabilizes to k on ε and k ∈ I S ; 2. learns S ∈ C by erasing iff it learns by erasing S from every ε for S;
3. learns C by erasing iff it learns by erasing every S ∈ C.
Modal Logics of Multi-agent Belief Change
In this paper we will be interested in two logical approaches to multi-agent belief change: the temporal approach [11, 7] and the dynamic approach [3] .
The temporal approach
Temporal logics can be used to study the evolution of a system over time. Doxastic Epistemic Temporal Logics offer a global view of the evolution of a multi-agent system as events take place, focusing on the information that agents possess and what they believe.
Models
We interpret these logics on doxastic epistemic temporal forests [11] . Such logics could as well be interpreted on Interpreted Systems ( [7] , see [8] for a doxastic counterpart).
is closed under non-empty finite prefixes, for each i ∈ N , ≤ i ⊆ H × H is a well-founded pre-order on H, ∼ i ⊆ H × H is an equivalence relation and V : P rop → ℘(H). We write wh or w e (resp. w ) to denote some finite (respectively ω-) history starting in the state w.
Intuitively P(w) is the protocol or bundle of sequences of events associated with w. We refer to the information of agent i at w by
i.e the histories that i considers the most plausible at history h.
Assumptions about the agents
Further assumptions about these structures will be considered in this paper.
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Definition 2.2 (Perfect Recall). We say that all agents in a group
We write P R(G).
Definition 2.3 (Synchronicity).
We say that all agents in a group G ⊆ N satisfy Synchronicity iff
We write SY N (G).
Definition 2.4 (E-Uniform No Miracles)
. Let E ⊆ Σ. We say that all agents in a group G ⊆ N satisfies E-Uniform No Miracles iff ∀i ∈ G ∀e 1 , e 2 ∈ E if ∃he 1 , h e 2 such that he 1 ∼ i h e 2 then ∀je 1 , j e 2 ∈ W if j ∼ i j then je 1 ∼ i j e 2 . We write E − U N M (G).
Definition 2.5 (Perfect Observation). We say that all agents in a group
Definition 2.6 (Preference Stability). We say that all agents in a group G ⊆ N satisfies Perfect Recall iff ∀i ∈ G∀he, h f ∈ H we have he ≤ i h f iff h ≤ i h . We write P S(G).
A natural doxastic epistemic temporal language
Syntax Our dynamic epistemic temporal language of L DET is defined by the following inductive syntax.
where i ranges over N , a over Σ, and p over proposition letters prop. K i φ (B i φ) reads i knows (resp. believes) that φ. F and P stand for future and past. ∀φ means: in all continuations φ. Hφ := ¬P ¬φ.
Semantics L DET is interpreted over pairs of nodes w e, i.e. initial state together with a finite sequence of events and maximal histories w in our trees, such that e is a finite prefix of (cf. [12, 11] ).
Definition 2.7 (Truth definition).
We only give the interesting clauses.
such that f .a = e and H, w , w f φ H, w , w e F φ iff ∃ g ∈ Σ * ∃ f such that f = e g and H, w , w f φ H, w , w e P φ iff ∃ g ∈ Σ * ∃ f such that f g = e and H, w , w f φ H, w , w e ∀φ iff ∀h ∈ P(w) s.t. e h we have H, wh , w e φ
The dynamic approach
The dynamic approach of Dynamic Doxastic and Dynamic Epistemic Logics (DDL and DEL for short) considers belief change as a step by step operation on models.
Definition 2.8 (Epistemic-Plausibility and Event Models, Product Update).
• An epistemic plausibility model (EP for short) M is of the form W, (∼ i ) i∈N , (≤ i ) i∈N , V where W = ∅, for each i ∈ N , ∼ i is a binary reflexive and euclidean relation on W , ≤ i is a pre-order on W and
• An event model = E, (∼ i ) i∈N , pre has E = ∅, and for each i ∈ N , ∼ i is a relation on W . Finally, there is a precondition map pre : E → L DL , where L DL is some doxastic language.
2 .
• The product update M⊗ of an epistemic model M = W, (∼ i ) i∈N , V with an event model is the model E, (∼ i ) i∈N , pre , whose worlds are pairs (w, e) with the world w satisfying the precondition of the event e, and accessibilities defined as:
(w, e) ∼ i (w , e ) iff e ∼ i e , w ∼ i w An EP model describes what agents currently believe and know, while product update creates the new doxastic epistemic situation after some information event has taken place.
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Recently DEL borrowed the crucial idea of protocol from the temporal approach. A protocol P maps states in an EP model to sets of finite sequences of pointed event models closed under taking prefixes. This defines the admissible runs of some informational process: not every observation may be available, or appropriate. We let E be the class of all pointed plausibility event models. Let P rot(E) = {P ⊆ (E * ∪ E ω ) | P is closed under finite prefixes } be the co-domain of protocols, it is the class of all sets of sequences (infinite and finite) of pointed plausibility event models closed under taking finite prefixes. Given some ∈ E ω we often refer the generated
Definition 2.9. Given an EP model M. A local protocol for M is a function P : |M| → P rot(E).
Dynamic doxastic language
We first look at a core language that matches dynamic belief update.
Syntax Our dynamic doxastic language L DDE is defined as follows:
where i ranges over over N , p over a countable set of proposition letters P rop, and ( , e) ranges over a suitable set of symbols for event models.
Semantics Here is how we interpret the DDE(L) language. A pointed event model is an event model plus some distinguished element of its domain. To economize on notation we use event symbols in the semantic clause. Also, we write pre(e) for pre (e) when it is clear from context.
Definition 2.10 (Truth definition).
, e φ iff M, w pre(e) and M × , (w, e) φ
We make use of the usual abbreviations.
Connection between the temporal and the dynamic approach
There is a connection between the two approaches. In fact the Product Updaters of the dynamic approach are just one interesting type of doxastic (temporal) agents. Indeed Iterated Product Update of an epistemic plausibility model according to a uniform line protocol P generates doxastic epistemic temporal forests that validate particular doxastic temporal properties. We use the following construction:
• Let Σ := w∈W n∈ω P (w)(n).
•
) and e 1 . . . e n+1 ∈ P (w)}.
Finally information partitions and plausibility are defined according to Product Update.
• For 1 < k ≤ m, he ∼ i h e iff he, h e ∈ H k , h ∼ i h , e and e are pointed event-model from the same event model and e ∼ i e in their event model.
We conclude by mentioning an important representation theorem that we will later make use of. First we introduce the following notion: Definition 2.12 (Propositional Stability). We say that a forest satisfies propositional stability iff for all h, he ∈ H we have p ∈ V (he) iff p ∈ V (h). Theorem 2.13 (van Benthem et al. [5] ). An ET L-model H is isomorphic to the forest generated by the sequential product update of an epistemic model according to some state-dependent DEL-protocol iff it satisfies P R(N ), U N M (N ), SY N (G) and Propositional Stability.
A simple way to update doxastic epistemic model in a DEL style is to actually update the epistemic relation according to Product Update while leaving the plausibility relation unmodified.
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Let us know mention an important corollary: Corollary 2.14. A DET L-model is isomorphic to the forest generated by the sequential product update of a doxastic epistemic model according to some state-dependent DEL-protocol iff it satisfies P R(N ), U N M (N ), SY N (G), Propositional Stability and P S(N ).
A final piece of notation: given a DET L (resp. EP ) model H (resp. M) we write F (H) (resp. F (M)) to denote the frame of the model, i.e. the model without the valuation function.
DETL reductions and representation theorems for learnability.
The aim of this section is to give a first result bridging Learning Theory and Dynamic Epistemic Temporal Logics. In particular we prove that the problem of checking whether a class of sets is finitely identifiable can be reduced to the model-checking problem of L DET on Doxastic Epistemic Temporal Forests.
In general Learning Situations will be captured by doxastic epistemic temporal structures. In the case of Set Learning, they can be more specifically and accurately captured by a doxastic epistemic model and a local protocol. We start by giving a formal definition of such a construction.
Protocols that correspond to set learning
Given a countable class of countable sets Ω = {S 1 , . . . , S n , . . .} a Set Learning Situation is a triple Sit Ω := Ω, S, L where S = S∈Ω S and L is the identity map. In words environments will enumerate elements from the sets in Ω (see Section 1). Given the Set Learning Situation Sit Ω = Ω, S, L we can construct an initial epistemic model M Ω and a local protocol P Ω .
Initial epistemic model. Our initial epistemic model M
Sit Ω = W Ω , ∼, V where W Ω = Ω, ∼= W × W and for each set S n ∈ Ω, we set V (i n ) = {S n }. In words, we identify states of the model with sets. We also assume that our agent does not have any particular initial information and for each state S n , i n is some nominal for S n .
Class of event models. For each e ∈ S, we have a corresponding event model e = {e}, ∼ e where ∼ e = (e, e). In words we assume that our agent has perfect observational powers.
Given a set S, we write E(S) = {(e, e) | e ∈ S}. We are now ready to define our local protocol. Local protocol. Given a state s ∈ W , our protocol P Ω will authorize at s any ω-sequence that enumerate s. Formally: for every s ∈ W , P Ω (s) is the smallest subset of ((E(S)) * ∪ (E(S)) ω ) that contains {f : ω → E(s) | f is surjective } and that is closed under non-empty finite prefixes.
DETL Reduction of Learning Problems
Definition 3.1 (Stabilization). j's belief (resp. knowledge) about the initial state stabilizes to w on the history v iff there is a finite prefix e * such that for any finite sequence e such that e * e we have for all histories sh if sh ∈ B j [ve ] then s = w (resp. for
Given a collection of sets Ω = {S 1 , . . . , S n , . . .} we let prop Ω = {i n | S n ∈ Ω}. In what follows we indicate one of the possible logical reductions of the problem of finite identifiability. We reduce it to the model checking of an hybrid extension of L DET that we lack the space to introduce (see Appendix for details). The following holds: Proposition 3.2. The following are equivalent:
1. Ω is finitely identifiable.
2. For all s ∈ W Ω and ∈ P Ω the learner's knowledge about the initial state stabilizes to s on s . 
One can thus reduce Finite Identifiability to Model Checking of an hybrid doxastic epistemic temporal language. But there are other interesting directions. Below we use another approach that gives more intuitive DET L reduction. We let nom be a set of propositionally stable nominals, i.e. for each i ∈ nom, and for each valuation V , V (i) ∈ W and whose truth conditions is given by H, w , w e i iff V (i) = w. We can now reduce various Learnability problems to the (extended) validity problem of some DET L formulas, i.e. we specify DET L conditions that must be validated by a protocol to guarantee learnability.
We are going to proceed with an attempt to find a uniform representation of learning types. Here is the general scheme of our uniform representation of learning types: A DETL frame F (H) satisfies Learning Condition iff [Specification of a procedure of choosing the current belief]
The most straight-forward is the characteristics of finite identifiability.
Learner can finitely identify a class iff for all elements i of the class if i holds, then in the future Learner will know that i.
Further extension of the validity approach demands more expressive power, namely we need to express the existence of an appropriate belief-choosing procedure, which leads to Dyadic Second Order quantification. If we skip the certainty condition, we get the characteristics of learning by erasing.
The effectiveness of this procedure, in the presence of uncertainty, is guaranteed by the existence of an underlying preference ordering. The temporal condition is weakened, since Learner can not be guaranteed certainty. The success is defined as a stabilization to a correct hypothesis.
In general if we allow some freedom in defining beliefs, we can make an attempt to formalize computable identification in the limit.
In this expression the B-Algorithm is an effective procedure that at each step of the procedure computes the current belief. If we do not pose the restriction to computable functions we get the general identification in the limit. In general we can make further substitution to our general scheme and see what happens. Let us consider the following example.
Property of F(H) iff ∃ ≤ F (H[≤])i → ∃F GBi
Here, we again take a preference ordering to determine the current belief, but we only require that the convergence happens only for some environments. We can immediately see that this is an overuse of the scheme. To guarantee an "honest" convergence, we have to require that it happens for all allowed sequences of events. Otherwise we have to deal with a situation in which the correct answer is "communicated" to the learner by a particular sequence encoding the answer.
Characterizing protocols that guarantee learnability
We now prove representation theorems that characterize classes of DET L models in which learnability is guaranteed. We start by giving two intuitive results and then we move to give a DET L counterpart of Angluin's Theorem. Proposition 3.3. A synchronous, perfect recall, perfect observation DET L model W, Σ, H, ∼, ≤, V satisfies finite identifiability whenever for all w ∈ W and history wh ∈ H ∩ Σ ω , there is some natural number n ∈ ω such that for every v = w such that v ∈ W and for every wh ∈ H ∩ Σ ω we have (h|n) = (h |n) Proposition 3.4. A permutation closed, synchronous, perfect recall, perfect obervation DET L model W, Σ, H, ∼, ≤, V based on a finite state space satisfies finite identifiability whenever for all w ∈ W for all v = w there is some event a ∈ (Σ ∩ P(w) − P(v)).
We now turn to a DETL counterpart to one of the most important results in learning theory: Angluin's theorem. This theorem characterizes learnable classes of sets.
Theorem 3.5 (Angluin [1] ). A class of sets C is identifiable in the limit iff for all S ∈ C there is a finite D S ⊆ S such that for all S ∈ C, if S = S and D S ∈ S , then S ⊆ S.
The next result is proved using once more the concept of a DEL-generated forest. Before we state the result, let us introduce the following definitions:
Set-driven A local protocol P for M is set-driven iff ∀w∃S w ⊆ N such that ∀ε ∈ P (w) content(ε) = S w .
A-condition for protocols A local protocol P satisfies the A-condition iff
Finite identifiability of the incomparable A local protocol P satisfies the condition of finite identifiability of the incomparable sets iff states whose image under P are ⊆-incomparable constitute finitely identifiable classes.
Let us assume that a local protocol P satisfies finite identifiability of the incomparable. The we can show the following equivalence. Theorem 3.6. A state space W together with a set-driven local protocol P satisfies A-condition iff there is a preference ordering ≤ on W and an epistemic plausibility frame M = (W, ∼, ≤), where ∼= W × W such that (#) for all w ∈ W and for all ε ∈ P (w) there is some n ∈ ω such that for every m > n, w ∈ |M ε|m | and w is the ≤-minimum of |M ε|m | in the generated doxastic model M ε|m .
Notions from LT vs Notions from DTL
Learners vs Doxastic Agents. In Learning Theory the agent is usually assumed to be an arbitrary computably enumerable function that transforms finite sequences of data into conjectures about the underlying rules. This setting is very general and allows for analyzing learning settings that are in fact epistemically quite improbable. Various restrictions has been put on the learners to see how different "impairments" affect learning. Let us briefly discuss some of them.
Consistency Learner's answers are always consistent with the up-to-now given data.
Conservatism Learner changes his conjecture only when it is necessary, i.e. only when the last piece of data contradicts the previous conjecture.
Set-drivenness Let L be a learning function. L is set driven iff for all t, s ∈ SEQ, if set(t) = set(s), then L(t) = L(s).
The correspondence between Learners and doxastic agents can be established via different epistemic interpretations of the learning situation. We present our conjectures in Table 1 .
DETL notions
LT properties hard incoming information consistent learning preference stability conservative learning uniform no miracles set-driven learning Table 1 
: DETL Notions vs Properties of Learners
Non-introspective knowledge. Notions of knowledge and belief are not explicitly involved in Formal Learning Theory. However they are a by-product of its analysis of inductive inference. In a successful identification in the limit the learner stabilizes to a correct hypothesis (belief). But, the process leads to something more than belief. LT shows that for some classes of problems there are procedures of belief change that guarantee success. After converging Learner's beliefs are safe, they will not change under any true information. LT thus stress the operational aspect of a successful belief-change. The process results therefore in a state of "non-introspective knowledge". In DET L terms ∀F GBφ → K∀F GBφ .
Multi-agent learning
Let us now have a look at learning from the perspective of multi-agents logics of belief change. What if more than one agents are learning together? In some epistemic scenarios, like Muddy Children [7] , the fact that the agents are publicly sharing something about their doxastic state is crucial. To illustrate this let us take a pointed epistemic model that specifies the Muddy Children scenario with at least two muddy children. Imagine that for every child we have an atomic formula p i , indicating that child i is muddy. Let us compare two protocols.
1. The father keeps announcing i p i . The protocol maps each state in which at least one of the children is muddy to the prefix-closure of {! i p i } ω and to the empty set otherwise.
2. Similarly, the father keeps announcing i p i in muddy state, but before each announcement the children publicly announce their belief.
To define formally the second type of protocol we introduce an abstract, model-independent concept of belief announcement. We thus start by extending our set of events so that it includes the event !B which intuitively corresponds the fact that the agents are making their beliefs public. !B is treated as a special kind of event-model for which Product Update is defined as follows.
This special event has a natural counterpart in DETL style frameworks.
Definition 5.2. !B is the Belief Announcement event iff for all h, h we have
It is now possible to define the transformation of protocol we have mentioned at the beginning of this section. We leave the definition to the appendix and rather go on to present our findings. Simply note that P !B stand transformation of P as explained in our starting example. The following proposition extends the representations results of Section 2 to include Belief Announcement and will be useful to prove our next result. This representation result will be useful since it allows to talk of such DEL-generated forests as particular of DET L models. The next theorem proves that in typical DEL situations if agents starts with the same background information and have the same observational powers then allowing the agents to announce their beliefs does not allow them to learn anything more.
Theorem 5.4. Whenever agents have the same background information and the same observational powers, then there is no knowledge gain by forcing announcement of beliefs between each step. Formally, let M be a doxastic epistemic model that satisfies SII(N ) and P a local protocol for M such that P satisfies SOC(N ). Let For(M, P )[(∼ i ) i∈N ] be the doxastic epistemic forest generated by M and P and
) i∈N ] be the doxastic epistemic forest generated by M and !B(p).
The following corollary is of interest from the perspective of learning theory Corollary 5.5. Given some EP model M in which the agents have the same background information and a protocol P for M in which agents have same observational powers. ∀j ∈ N , ∀w ∈ |M| and ∀ ∈ P (w) , j's belief stabilizes on the same initial state of the world in the model without announcement of beliefs (For(M, p) ) and in the model with announcement of beliefs (For(M, !B(p))).
Conclusion
This work provides a comparison of the notions of learning theory, doxastic temporal logic and dynamic doxastic logic. We show than the problem of learnability can either be reduced to the model checking problem or to the validity problem of some doxastic temporal language. We provide a main theorem characterizing identifiability in the limit in terms of properties of temporal protocols. We also introduce multi-agent identification, and give conditions under which the possibility of communication between the agents does not influence their individual learning process.
We have shown that the two prominent approaches, learning theory and doxastic temporal logic, can be joined in order to describe the notions of belief and knowledge involved in inductive inference. Also, our representation of hypothesis space and environments gives an additional interesting application for the theory of protocols. We believe that bridging the two approaches together benefits both sides. For formal learning theory, to create a logic for it is to provide additional insight into the semantics of inductive learning. For logics of epistemic and doxastic change, it enriches their present scope with different learning scenarios, i.e. those based not only on the incorporation of new data but also on generalization. Further issues that we are interested in are: extending our approach to other types of identification, e.g. identification of functions; finding modal framework for learning from both positive and negative information; studying systematically the effects of different constraints on protocols.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Corollary 2.14 Proof. Since the epistemic part Theorem 2.13 of is unchanged we have only have to do two things.
Prove soundness of P S(N )
2. Fix the construction for the plausibility ordering For soundness of P S(N ). Assume that in a DET L forest generated by a protocol we have whe, vh e ∈ and wh ≤ i vh . It follows by Definition 2.11 that whe ≤ i vh e .
For the construction we prove that whe ≤ i vh e iff whe ≤ Proof of Proposition 3.2 In this paper it will be useful to work with an hybrid extension of the L DET language. In which cases the language, which gains two more clauses φ := p|x| . . . | ↓ x.φ (where x ranges over a countable set of node variables svar), is interpreted as before but together with an assignment function g : svar → H. The intuition is that x can be used to name some node in the tree that can be refer to as a propositional letter and that ↓ x is the action of setting the variable x to name the current node. More details in [6] . We only give the clauses for which the addition of g matters:
H, w , w e, g x iff g(x) = w e H, w , w e, g ↓ x.φ iff H, w , w e, g[g(x) := w e] φ Proof. We sketch the proof of 1 ⇒ 2. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that there is a state s ∈ W Ω and ω-sequence ∈ P Ω (s) such that agent's knowledge does not stabilize to s on . There are two cases. Case 1: The learner stabilizes to another state, but by construction of P Ω (s) and definition of a generated DEL-forest for every finite prefix e , s e ∈ K[s e], contradiction. So we are in the other case. Case 2: After each finite prefix e , there is at least a state different from s that remains epistemically possible. Since generated DEL forest satisfies Perfect Recall (Theorem 2.13), it follows that there is some state s = t that remains epistemically possible after each finite prefix e . But by construction of P Ω (s) this is only possible if s ⊂ t. Now assume for contradiction that Ω is Finitely Identifiable. It follows that the learner stops after some finite prefix e * . There are two possibilities. Case 1: Learner select s after e * . But since s ⊂ t, e * is the finite prefix of some environment t for t. So assume that Nature chooses t and t , then learner will stop after e * and select s. But this contradicts the fact that Ω is Finitely Identifiable. Case 2: Learner select another state than s. But then the learner fails to identify s on . Contradiction.
We now sketch the proof of 2 ⇒ 3. We prove the contrapositive. Assume that For(
. But this means that we some history that satisfies −1 ⊥, i.e. by truth condition, some initial state in w ∈ W Ω such that for some ∈ P Ω and for all finite prefix e * we have For(
. By truth condition of K and H( −1 ⊥ → x)) this means that there is some history vh ∈ K[we * ] such that v = w. But this means that Learner's knowledge does not stabilize to w on w in F or(F (M Sit Ω ), V Ω , P Ω ). Concluding this direction.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
Proof. From right to left. Take an arbitrary w. We have by assumption some n ∈ ω such that for every v = w such that v ∈ W and for every wh ∈ H ∩ Σ ω we have (h|n) = (h |n). We prove that w(h|n) ∼ v(h |n) by an inductive argument. Indeed assume that they are in the same information partition. Then by Perfect Observation the last events were the same. But PR we also have that the nodes right before were also in the same information partition so we can iterate this argument and apply Perfect Observation all the way down, proving that (h|n) = (h |n). Contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 3.4
Proof. From right to left. Take an arbitrary w and (w). For each v = w we have some a that occurs by Permutation Closure on (w). We refer to it as a w (v). Since W is finite so is { −1 (a w (v))|v = w}. We can thus take the least upper bound of the previous set, call it m. Now assume that some state v = w is still considered possible at (w)(m + 1). By the argument in previous proof, it means that there is an environment in P (v) in which also a w (v) occurs. Contradiction.
Proof of Theorem 3.6
Proof. (⇒) Let us assume that W, P satisfies A-condition, well-foundedness and finite identifiability of the incomparable. Let us define the preference ordering ≤ in the following way:
Note by the fact that we deal with a doxastic epistemic model and protocol that correspond to a set learning situation we have that v w iff v = w, where v w iff v ≤ w and w ≤ v (1).
We have to show that ≤ satisfies (#). Let us then take a hypothesis w ∈ W and choose one environment for w, i.e. a particular ε ∈ P (w). We show that there is some n ∈ N such that for every m > n, w ∈ |M ε|m | and w is the ≤-minimum of |M ε|m | in the generated doxastic model M ε|m . To show that we have to consider all v = w such that v ≤ w or such that v is ≤-incomparable to w. We show that there is a finite stage of the epistemic update at which v is eliminated, i.e. w is the ≤-minimal element of |M ε|m |. Let us first take v ∈ W such that v ≤ w. By (1), if v ≤ w then P (v) ⊂ P (w). Then there is a sequence e ∈ Σ such that e ∈ P (w) but e / ∈ P (W ). And since protocols allow environments that enumerate all and only elements from the set S w , e will appear at some point and at which v will be eliminated as inconsistent with e.
The fact that all v ≤ w are going to be eliminated at some finite stage is guaranteed by the fact that the protocol satisfies the A-condition, i.e. there is no w ∈ W such that for all e ∈ P (w) ∩ Σ * there is v ∈ W such that v = w and P (v) ⊂ P (w), which implies that for each w ∈ W there is only finite number of v ∈ W , such that v ≤ w.
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If v is ≤-incomparable to w, then P (v) P (w) and P (w) P (v). Therefore there is an event e ∈ Σ such that e ∈ P (w) and e / ∈ P (v). And since protocols allow environments that enumerate all and only elements from the set S w , e will appear at some point and at which v will be eliminated as inconsistent with e.
Moreover, all v ∈ W such that v is ≤-incomparable to w will be eliminated at some finite stage by assumption of finite identifiability of the incomparable.
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Therefore we can conclude that at some finite stage m, all v ∈ W that are either ≤-smaller that w or are ≤-incomparable to w will get eliminated, leaving w the smallest state in |M ε|m |. (⇐) Assume that there is a preference ordering on W , such that it satisfies (#). To see that the underlying protocols satisfy A-condition for each w ∈ W we take ε w ∈ P (w) and, from the assumption, for each ε w there is n such that for all m ≥ n, M εw|m = M and in w is minimal wrt ≤ in M . Let us take ε w |m = σ w . Since for each w, σ w is finite it is enough to show that for all v ∈ W such that v = w if σ w ∈ P (v) then P (v) P (w).
For a contradiction assume that there is v ∈ W such that σ w ∈ P (v) ∧ P (v) ⊂ P (w). Let τ ∈ P (v) such that τ |length(σ w ) = σ w (there is such because τ ∈ P (v)). From the assumption, M τ converges to a model that has w as minimal wrt to ≤. But v = w, so we have that for one environment v, namely τ ∈ P (v), M τ will converge to a model with w as the minimal and not v. Contradiction.
Definitions omitted in Section 5. In Section 5 we omitted these lengthy definition which are necessary to understand the proofs to follow. First we define the transformation of a sequence of events and then of protocol as we have mentioned at the beginning of Section 5.
Definition 6.1. Given a finite sequence of events e 1 . . . e n ∈ E * , let !B(e 1 . . . e n ) denotes the sequence !Be 1 !Be 2 . . .!Be n !B. In particular !B(λ) =!B. Given an ω-sequence we define !B( ) as follows:
Definition 6.2 (!B transformation of a protocol). Given a EP model M and a local protocol P for M, the !B transformation of P is the function P !B such that for each w, P !B (w) is the smallest set of sequences such that !B(h) ∈ P !B (w) iff h ∈ P (w) and P !B (w) is closed under non-empty finite-prefixes.
Definition 6.3 (DET L model generated by !B transformation of a protocol). Due to the alternation, we only have to add the following elements to the construction of Definition 2.11.
We say that a DET L forest H satisfies Σ/Σ -alternation iff for all history whe, vh f ∈ H we have (e ∈ Σ iff f ∈ Σ ) iff len(whe) = len(vh f ) and moreover there is an history of the form we ∈ H such that e ∈ Σ.
We get the following result as corollary of Corollary 2.14.
Proof of Proposition 5.3
Proof. Necessity (1 =⇒ 2). We show that the given conditions are satisfied by any DET L model generated through successive Product Updates following !B-transformation of a protocol. This direction of the proof is easy so we only give the details for the other direction.
Sufficiency (2 =⇒ 1). Given a DET L model H satisfying the stated conditions, we show how to construct an epistemic plausibility model M and protocol P such that F is isomorphic to For(M, !B(P )).
Construction We first construct the initial model, then we construct our protocol.
Here is the initial epistemic plausibility model M 0 = W 0 , (∼ 0 i ) i∈N , (≤ 0 i ) i∈N ,V 0 :
• W 0 := {w ∈ W | len(h) = 1}.
• Set w ∼ 0 i v iff w ∼ i v.
• Set w ≤ 0 i v iff w ≤ i v.
• For every p ∈ P rop,V 0 (p) = V (p) ∩ W . Now for the protocol. By SYN(N), Σ-UNM and {!B}/Σ-alternation we can safely construct event models from synchronous slices of of the DET L model H. Now we construct the j-th event model j = E j , ( j i ) i∈N , pre j . If j is odd, then:
• E j := {!B ∈ {!B} | there is a history wh!B ∈ H with len(h) = j} = {!B} If j is even, then:
• E j := {e ∈ Σ | there is a history he ∈ H with len(h) = j} • Set a ∼ j i b iff there are ha, h b ∈ H such that len(h) = len(h) = j and ha ∼ i h b.
• For each e ∈ E j , let pre j (e) = We now define the protocol !B(P) as follows. For every w ∈ W 0 , every n ∈ ω and with len( ) = n, we let 1. |n − 1!B ∈ P (w) iff w ∈ H, whenevern is odd 2. |n − 1(E n , (n)) ∈ P (w) iff w ∈ H, whenever n is even Finally we let P we define inductively from !B to recover the sequences by eliminating !B events which is possible by {!B}/Σ-alternation. Now we show that the construction is correct in the following sense:
Claim 6.5 (Correctness). Let ∼ be the epistemic relation in the given doxastic epistemic temporal model. Let ∼ F be the epistemic relation in the forest model induced by Product Update over the just constructed plausibility model M 0 and the constructed protocol !B(P ) we have:
Proof of the claim. The proof is by induction on the length of histories (which is possible by SY N (N ).
The case for the plausibility ordering follows easily from Corollary 2.14. Now we consider the case of the epistemic relation. The base case is obvious from the construction of our initial model M 0 . Now comes the induction step:
From DET L to For(M, !B(P )). Due to {!B}/Σ-alternation, we are in one of two cases depending the parity of the length of the histories we are considering. The even case if as in Theorem 2.13. Assume it is odd. Now assume that h 1 !B ∼ j h 2 !B (1). It follows from Perfect Recall that h 1 ∼ j h 2 (2). But from IH we have then h 1 ∼ From For(M, !B(P )) to DET L. Again due to {!B}/Σ-alternation, we are in one of two cases depending the parity of the length of the histories we are considering.
The even case if as in Theorem 2.13. Assume it is odd. Now assume that h 1 !B ∼ (9) . But (9), (6) and he assumption that !B is Belief Announcement event we have h 1 !B ∼ j h 2 !B.
Proof of Theorem 5.4 In the proof of this theorem we will need the two following Lemmas. Lemma 6.6 (Same info Lemma). Let H= W, Σ, H, (≤ i ) i∈N , (∼ i ) i∈N , V be a doxastic epistemic model satisfying SOC(i, j), P R(i, j), SY N (i, j) and SII(i, j), it follows that for all h , h ∈ H, we have h ∼ i h iff h ∼ j h .
